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Explosive Remnants of War and the
Reality of Azerbaijan
This article explains the danger of explosive remnants of war1 when located
within communities and the precautions that need to be taken in order to
get rid of this problem. It also describes how the Azerbaijan National Agency
for Mine Action is trying to address the problem of abandoned ammunition
storage in one of the most highly contaminated areas among existing
abandoned ammunition storages in the world.
by Nazim Ismaylov and Emil Hasanov [ Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action ]

T

oday, there are still some discussions
on the definition of explosive remnants
of war, but it is generally understood
that the problems ERW cause are both widespread and long-term, and that the number
of casualties and deaths caused by both unexploded and abandoned grenades, mortar shells,
fuzes and cluster bombs is high and equivalent
to landmines. The physical and psychological impacts of ERW on a community are
significant considering the number of deaths
and nature of injuries caused, which can
overload often stretched medical infrastructures. ERW also have a wider socioeconomic
impact on affected communities in terms
of land use and blockages to reconstruction
and development activities.
The main points related to the threats
caused by ERW are:
• Injuries or deaths can take place at a distance from the explosion.
• Items of unexploded ordnance are generally more powerful (and therefore
more lethal) than anti-personnel mines.
• When UXO accidents do not involve deaths, they typically
result in severe wounds.
• ERW are generally found on the surface and are therefore more
visible, which can result in more interaction with ERW than
mines. Also, UXO can be located subsurface where clearance
can be particularly difficult.
• The fear of UXO is generally lower than the fear of mines because UXO can be more visible and this gives people a false
impression of safety, which can be very dangerous.
• ERW are unpredictable and can detonate at anytime due to a
variety of stimuli.
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Despite the fact that Azerbaijan has not
signed the Ottawa Convention, the country
is supportive of it according to “Azerbaijan
and the Ottawa Process.”4 This document
states, “The government of Azerbaijan has
supported from the outset the idea of having
a comprehensive international legal document on prohibition of use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.
Our country has learnt the catastrophe
that this ammunition can bring. Therefore
Azerbaijan advocates demining and destruction of mines. Azerbaijan shares all concerns
taken into consideration while coming to
the statement of the Convention and is involved neither in transfer, transportation,
nor in production of anti-personnel mines.
But continued conflict prevents Azerbaijan
from acceding to the Document.” The government of Azerbaijan hopes to sign the
Ottawa Convention once the conflicts in its
territories are resolved.
UXO Operations and Abandoned
Ammunition Storage Clearance
History of the problem. A military ammunition warehouse located in Agstafa, consisting of 138 bunkers, was the largest Soviet
warehouse in the south Caucasus. Agstafa is
located in the northwest part of Azerbaijan,
bordering the Kazakh region in the west,
Tovuz in the east, the Republic of Georgia
in the north and Armenia in the south.
In 1991, when Azerbaijan regained independence, the warehouse was destroyed
by the Soviet Army before it departed. As a
result of the explosion, thousands of pieces

UXO operators’ rapid reaction to a violent explosion at an illegal workshop set up by locals approximately 200 metres
(219 yards) from residential area in Agstafa town (October 21, 2005).

of UXO were scattered over 44 square kilometres (17 square miles), posing serious
humanitarian, socioeconomic and environmental threats to the local population.
Since the explosion, 148 UXO-related
accidents have been reported, with 31 people dead and 80 injured. To collect scrap
metal from the UXO, people are exposing
themselves to injury and death. Some companies trying to gain profit have been involved
in illegally collecting UXO from surrounding areas, devising simple methods involving

Operational map of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Green denotes the occupied area
of Nagorny-Karabakh and seven surrounding areas.
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Azerbaijan has not signed the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons2 or the Ottawa Convention3 for several reasons including some political issues with neighbouring countries,
particularly the conditions of the war with Armenia. Armenia occupies the territory of Nagorny-Karabakh and seven surrounding
regions, totaling 20 percent of Azerbaijan. Today there are just under eight million people in Azerbaijan. Of these, 650,000 are internally displaced persons and 300,000 are ethnic Azeris who came to
Azerbaijan from Armenia.

Abandoned ammunitions in Saloglu village and surrounding areas (Agstafa region)—presently an operational site
for clearance.

very unsafe techniques. By selling the metal
and non-ferrous parts of the projectiles,
both individuals and companies supplement their income. This is the principal
cause of many deaths and injuries among
the people living near Saloglu, a village in
Agstafa. A recent accident involved the
death of a young man searching among the
unexploded bombs for copper to sell at the
local market.
Azerbaijan appealed to NATO for assistance in the clearance of the Saloglu area
and the destruction of stockpiled UXO. As
an initial step, the NATO Maintenance and
Supply Agency conducted a technical assessment of the site and consequently the
Partnership for Peace Trust Fund on the
Saloglu Project was established. The role of
the lead nation in the Saloglu Project was
given to Turkey.
On 14 February 2005 all efforts aimed at
facilitating the Saloglu Project in Azerbaijan
were brought together at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Turkey signed
the Financial Management Agreement for
the project at a special ceremony involving
NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer and the representatives of contributing countries.
The total cost of the project is valued
at €1,047,649 (approximately US$1.3 million) and is estimated it will last 16 months.
Azerbaijan, as a host nation, met all the
commitments on the project. With contributions from NATO and individual partner nations—namely Australia, Finland,
Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey

10.2 | winter 2006 | journal of mine action | focus | 19

and the United States—as well as the United
Nations Development Programme, the
required funding for the project has been
raised. The Azerbaijan National Agency or
Mine Action UXO team, with a capacity
of 11 UXO operators, launched the project 13 December 2005. ANAMA instructors joined with United States European
Command (USEUCOM) specialists to  
train an additional 36 UXO operators for
the same project at ANAMA’s Regional
Office in Khanlar (UXO team capacity
within ANAMA was created with the support of USEUCOM in 2002).
Abandoned ammunition storage clearance. In describing the problem of ERW,
the threat of abandoned ammunition is also
significant. When researching information
on the subject of abandoned ammunition,
cases can be found in Nigeria, Albania and
Kuwait, but thus far minimal information
describing Azerbaijan’s abandoned ammunition problem is available. The Soviet warehouse in Agstafa can provide an additional
case for better understanding the threat of
abandoned ammunition and the challenges
that groups like ANAMA face in order to
clear this type of ERW.
The task for abandoned Soviet munition
storage clearance in Agstafa is very complicated and dangerous for several reasons:
• The occurrence of “ammunition
spreads” in which different types of
ammunition are mixed and scattered
throughout the area
• The presence of degraded flechette
and fragmentation ammunition,
which consist of small projectile darts
and shrapnel that are hazardous and
not immediately identifiable
• The presence of white phosphorus,
which ignites when exposed to air
• Incorrect or misleading marking
of UXO

Taking into account that 15 years have
passed since the warehouse explosion, clearance of this ammunition is a complicated—
yet extremely important—task.
In addition to planned clearance projects such as these mentioned, ANAMA
also provides rapid response to mine/UXOrelated emergencies. When one Agstafa
scrap-metal workshop set up by locals
exploded approximately 200 metres (219
yards) from a residential area, the workshop
itself was totally destroyed and, according
to official information by local authorities,
three people were killed and 23 injured.
Additionally, the explosion damaged houses
as far as three kilometres (two miles) from
the workshop. Immediately following the
explosion, ANAMA established a team of
UXO operators to carry out emergency
marking and clearance operations in the
incident area. Operations lasted for one
month and as a result, 170,000 square metres (42 acres) of land were cleared and
more than 5,007 items of UXO (among
them 1,261 pieces containing white phosphorous) were removed from the area
and destroyed. ANAMA has continued
to react quickly to any mine- and UXOrelated emergencies.
Conclusion
As the Japanese might say, “Tada yori
takai mono wa nai” (“We have to pay much
more for something we got free of charge”).
It is important to figure out how to solve the
existing problem of UXO and abandoned
ammunition and how to protect ourselves
from ERW in the future. Human beings
created the problem—dropping the bombs
and abandoning the ammunition “for free”
on Azerbaijan—and now they must correct
it at great cost by cleaning up the country
and making it safe again.
See Endnotes, page 109
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Mines Advisory Group, in partnership with CEIA USA, will sponsor a 423-kilometre (263-mile)
bike trek across Death Valley, USA. Event organizers hope to raise nearly £40,000 (US$74,000)
to support mine-action efforts around the globe.
From 4–11 March 2007, 40 participants will travel and cycle to raise money and awareness. The
registration fee for the event is only £175 ($325), but each participant is asked to raise
£2,750 ($5,100) in sponsorships, half of which will cover the cost of running the event.
Included in trek costs are London-to-Las Vegas airfare, accommodations, nearly all meals,
the use of bicycles and other sundry expenses.

The author discusses the challenges of protecting aid workers riding in
traditional unarmoured vehicles from the dangers of explosive remnants of
war. He offers some practical, after-market solutions that provide a high level
of protection for much less than the cost of traditional armoured vehicles.
by Thomas Hvidtfeldt [ Scanfiber Composites A/S ]

Effect from fragmenting mine on a vehicle. Here a car’s steel-plate body was ruptured by fragments
from a small hand grenade.

Side Protection and Seat Protection is one product that offers protection from roadside bombs.
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F

ollowing a conflict, humanitarian organisations are generally
the first to enter a country to deliver aid and start to rebuild
the country’s infrastructure. Aid workers often rely on a 4x4
sport-utility vehicle to transport supplies and people. This type of
carrier is viewed as a big, strong vehicle with high mobility, but it offers little protection against landmines and other explosive remnants
of war. It is what is known as a “soft vehicle.”
The term ERW is very wide and covers anything from handgun
ammunition to aircraft bombs.1 The majority of injuries, however, are
caused by devices like anti-personnel landmines, anti-tank mines and, as
seen recently in Lebanon, air-dropped submunition “bomblets.” Apart
from being the most numerous, AP mines are directed against people
on foot and are normally designed to explode following a relatively small
impact—often by the pressure of a foot or the tripping of a wire.
At the same time, small- or large-calibre gun ammunition, aircraft bombs and mortar rounds tend to be more stable—although
when they do explode, the results can be much more devastating.

The extent to which AP mines endanger passengers in a softskinned SUV depends heavily upon which type of device we’re
talking about. We can separate the various devices into two groups
depending on their primary kill mechanism:
• Blast ammunition works by creating a powerful blast wave
that destroys objects in close proximity to the explosion.
• Fragmenting ammunition works by creating a cloud of highvelocity steel fragments intended to inflict as much damage as
possible to anything or anyone in the surrounding area.
Most AP mines inflict injury primarily through the blast effect
and normally detonate by pressure. The effect from the blast wave
decreases rapidly with distance and it is often a “one kill” weapon.
On the other hand, some AP mines and many types of air-dropped
bomblets work with fragmentation as the primary kill mechanism.
The same goes for almost all mortar rounds and artillery ammunition. Contrary to a blast wave, which loses its power very quickly,
the high-density fragments surrounding the explosives maintain

For more information on this trip, visit www.magclearsmines.org.
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